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United States v. Distleir
INTRODUCTION
The equation is simple: increasingly large numbers of hazardous waste
sites, plus increasingly large price tags on their cleanup, plus heightened
concern for the environment and the federal budget equals corporate anxiety.
In particular, corporations which have purchased tainted assets-assets
associated with the seller's production or disposal of hazardous wastes-are
nervous. Their purchases could render them liable for skyrocketing cleanup
costs. Courts no longer hesitate to apply the traditional doctrine of successor
liability to CERCLA. In fact, United States v. Distler2 strains at the
limitations of this doctrine. It posits a new doctrine and paves the way for
ever-expanding successor liability under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
United States v. Distler elucidates how doctrines of successor liability
perform in the context of CERCLA. In Distler, the Angell Manufacturing
Corporation moved to dismiss a claim under section 107 of CERCLA.3
Angell's predecessor had contracted to transport and dispose of hazardous
waste at two sites.4 The government sought response costs for their cleanup;
1. 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
2. 1&
3. CERCLA § 107 provides, in part, that
1) the owner and operator of a ... facility, [and]
2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of... shall be liable for-
A) all costs of... remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State ... [and]
B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
4. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 638.
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Angell argued that no valid claim could be asserted against it as a successor
to the offending corporation.5
To answer Angell's motion, the court had to decide two issues: first,
whether CERCLA allowed successor liability; and second, how it should be
imposed. Not surprisingly, the court found that CERCLA implicitly provides
for successor liability.6 The second question, however, met with a more
startling answer. Under the traditional rule of successor liability, a corporation
is not liable for the acts of its predecessors unless at least one of four possible
exceptions has been met. Because of Angell's particular corporate history,
none was met.8 Ansell would have avoided liability entirely.'
At the government's behest, however, the court invoked a relatively new
theory in an even newer context. The court applied an expansive products
liability rule of successor liability: the continuity of the enterprise excep-
tion.' Under the rule, the United States had certainly stated a valid claim.
The court held that Angell could well have succeeded to CERCLA liability
because Angell was substantially the same business enterprise as its predeces-
sor."
I. LEGAL HISTORY
The Distler decision depends on the interplay of three different legal
histories: the traditional rule of successor liability; the products liability rule
of successor lability; and CERCLA's scope of liability.
A. The Traditional Rule of Successor Liability
The traditional rule stipulates that a corporation purchasing the assets of
another does not succeed to the seller's liabilities-with four exceptions.12
Liability will be imposed: 1) when the successor expressly or impliedly
agrees to assume the liabilities of the predecessor;13 2) when the transaction
5. Id. at 639.
6. Id. at 640; see infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 16, 52 and accompanying text.
9. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 641.
10. Id. at 642-43; see infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text for discussion of
this exception.
11. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 643.
12. See generally W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS, § 7122 (rev. perm. ed. 1983); see also Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers
Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1988).
13. This exception is governed strictly by contract interpretation principles. See,
[Vol. 56
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may be considered a de facto merger; 14 3) when the successor -may be
considered a "mere continuation" of the predecessor;5 or 4) when the
transaction was fraudulent. 16
e.g., Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Ladjevardian
v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Adams v. General
Dynamics Corp., 405 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co.,
288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968).
For this exception applied in the CERCLA context, see, for example, Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980
(1985); Keller v. Clark Equip. Co., 715 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1044 (1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 984 (D. S.C. 1984), affd sub nom United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160
(4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1106 (1989).
14. This exception depends on determining whether a merger has occurred.
Generally, courts look to four factors to determine whether two companies have
become one as a result of an asset transfer:
1) Continuation of the seller's enterprise: including continuity of
management, personnel, physical location, and general business operation;
2) Continuation of ownership, resulting from purchasing the assets
with shares of stock;
3) Dissolution of the seller corporation;
4) Assumption by the purchaser of those obligations of the seller
necessary for normal business operations to continue.
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 144, 151 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd,
762 F.2d 303 (1985).
See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Armour-Dial, Inc.,
v. Alkar Eng'r Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Wisc. 1979); Howard v. APAC-
Georgia, Inc., 192 Ga. App. 49,383 S.E.2d 617 (1989); Good v. Lackawanna Leather
Co., 96 N.J. Super. 439, 233 A.2d 201 (1967); Uni-Com Northwest Ltd. v. Argus
Publishing Co., 47 Wash. App. 787, 737 P.2d 304 (1987).
For this exception applied in the CERCLA context, see In re Acushnet River and
New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Mass. 1989); United States v. Vertac
Chem. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Ark. 1987), vacated, 855 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.
1988).
15. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
16. This exception is actually a part of each of the other exceptions. That is, the
function of the general rule of successor nonliability is to insure that those attempting
to evade liability and defraud others are held liable. See generally W. FLETCHER,
supra note 12, § 7125; 19 AM. JUR. 2D, Corporations, §§ 2707, 2716 (1989). See,
e.g., Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1984); Explosives
Corp. v. Garlan Enters. Corp., 615 F. Supp 364 (D. P.R. 1985), cause dismissed, 782
F.2d 1023 (1st Cir. 1985). See also Comment, Successor Liability in Corporate
Acquisitions-An Examination of Attempts to Limit the Use of the De Facto Merger
Doctrine, 46 J. AIR L. & CoM. 483, 496 (1981).
1991]
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Of particular importance in understanding Distler is the "mere continua-
tion" exception.17 This exception holds liable a corporation attempting to
"reorganize" its way out of liability, that is, transferring its assets to protect
them from those with claims against them.'8 One oft-cited case explains that
where the successor corporation is merely a "new hat" for the predecessor,
releasing the successor from liability "would amount to fraud."'9 In order
to discern these "new hatters" courts have relied on four factors: 1) common
identity of officers, directors, and shareholders; 2) continuity of business
operations: same products, employees, contracts, equipment and location; 3)
dissolution of selling corporation; and 4) inadequacy of consideration received
for the assets.2o
These factors embody the exception's function: to prevent fraud. They
distinguish bone fide sales between separate organizations from fraudulent
reorganizations of the same corporation.2'
17. The mere continuation exception is the only traditional exception seriously at
issue in Distler. A defacto merger is not a possibility because the transaction was not
between two separate corporate entities that became one. The successor was created
solely for the purpose of acquiring assets of the predecessor.
No evidence suggests that the transaction was made to defraud creditors of the
predecessor-so the exception for fraud would not apply. Furthermore, the contract
for the asset transfer expressly limited the liability to certain specified items not
including hazardous waste cleanup. Hence, the assumption exception would not apply.
18. An early Missouri case explains the nature of a mere continuation:
The thing which we pronounce unconscionable is an arrangement by which
one corporation takes from another all its property, deprives it of the means
of paying its debts, enables it to dissolve its corporate existence and place
itself practically beyond the reach of creditors, and this without assuming
its liabilities.
Hibernia Ins. Co. v. St. Louis & New Orleans Transp. Co., 13 F. 516, 519 (E.D. Mo.
1882).
19. Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App. 282, 297,562 A.2d 1286,
1293 (1989), cert. denied, 318 Md. 323, 568 A.2d 28 (1989).
20. Id. at 298-99, 562 A.2d at 1294.
21. The most important factor is "common identity." This criterion indicates to
courts that those controlling the selling corporation also control the buying corporation.
This control greatly increases the chances that the assets were transferred to shield
them from liability. Most courts agree that there can be no mere continuation without
this factor. See, e.g., H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc. v. Orgonics, Inc., 554 A.2d 196 (R.I.
1989); Cashar v. Redford, 28 Wash. App. 394, 624 P.2d 194 (1981).
The second factor, continuity of business operations, is some indication of a
corporation selling to itself, but is not dispositive of this exception. See, e.g., Carstedt
v. Grindelahd, 406 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. App. 1987).
The third factor, dissolution of seller, is significant insofar as it suggests a
completed plan to defraud creditors. If a predecessor is not able to satisfy its debt,
[Vol. 56
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/9
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
B. The Products Liability Rule of Successor Liability
Concerns that the scope of the traditional rule was too narrow prompted
some courts to enlarge it in the arena of products liability. Two new
exceptions emerged: the products line and the continuity of the enterprise
exceptions.
Ray v. Alad Corp.2' first fashioned the products line exception. The
rule provides for sweeping liability: a corporation continuing its predecessor's
product line under the same name and with no outwardly visible signs of the
change in ownership may be strictly liable for claims made against the
predecessor's products?8
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.24 and Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.25 are
the seminal cases for the continuity of the enterprise exception. This
exception overlaps the former because both take into account a continued
product line.8 Continuity of the enterprise, however, considers other factors
as well, and is considered less severe.' In essence, this exception creates an
addendum to the mere continuation exception under the traditional rule. The
addendum consists of several additional criteria which may qualify a successor
corporation for liability.' No one factor is dispositive.
courts are more likely to find successor liability. See, e.g., Forest Laboratories, Inc.
v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971); Groover v. West Coast Shipping Co.,
Inc., 479 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, Inc., 431
F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
The fourth factor, inadequate consideration, obviously frames this exception as
one designed to prevent fraud. See, e.g., Carstedt v. Grindeland, 406 N.W.2d 39
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Uni-Com Northwest, Ltd. v. Argus Publishing Co., 47 Wash.
App. 787, 737 P.2d 304 (1987). It also points to the origins of the mere continuation
exception itself; this exception grew out of the general rule of successor liability for
fraud. See Blair v. St. Louis H. & K.R. Co., 22 F. 36 (E.D. Mo. 1884) (mere
continuation case where court applied a bona fide purchaser analysis to determine if
transfer defrauded creditors).
22. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
23. Id. at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. See generally Note, Products
Liability of Successor Corporations: A Policy Analysis, 58 IND. L.J. 677 (1983); Note,
Expanding the Product Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HASTINGS L. REV.
1305 (1976).
24. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974). See Note, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.: Liability
of Business Transferees for Product Injuries, 27 ME. L. REv. 305 (1975).
25. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
26. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27. See Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985).
28. The additional factors occur when the successor: 1) retains the same
employees; 2) retains the same supervisory personnel; 3) retains the same production
1991]
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Paradoxically, the continuity of the enterprise exception does not simply
add to the mere continuation exception. Its additions substantively alter the
traditional exception. The additions change the function from preventing
transfers that "would amount to fraud" to assisting the risk-spreading role of
strict liability.2 Thus, under this products liability rule, it is possible for
arms' length asset transfers made in good faith to result in liability for the
successor.
30
C. CERCLA's Scope of Liability
Courts are quick to note CERCLA's "well-deserved notoriety for vaguely
drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory legislative history.
31
CERCLA's guidelines for liability bolster such notoriety. The Act renders
four categories of "persons" jointly and severally liable for the cleanup costs
of waste sites.32 The definition of "persons" is far from explicit. The statute
facilities in the same location; 4) continues producing the same products; 5) retains
the same name; 6) maintains continuity of asserts and general business operations; and
7) holds itself out to the public as the continuation of the previous corporation. Id.
29. A comparison of cases is helpful. Jackson v. Diamond T. Trucking Co., 100
N.J. Super. 186, 241 A.2d 471 (1968), provides a classic example of liability under the
mere continuation exception. In Jackson, a plaintiff sued a successor corporation to
collect a workers' compensation judgment. Id. at 190, 241 A.2d at 474. The
successor had received $100,000 of assets for nominal consideration. Id. at 189, 241
A.2d at 473. Both successor and predecessor shared the same president, director and
principal stockholder. Id. at 196, 241 A.2d at 477. Furthermore, the successor
continued the same business operations. Id. at 196-97, 241 A.2d at 477. The court
held the successor liable because the transaction amounted to evasion of liability by
a seller becoming its own purchaser. Id. at 198, 241 A.2d at 478.
Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1985), on the other hand,
represents the typical continuity of the enterprise case. In Mozingo, a corporation
acquired certain assets with adequate consideration and continued manufacturing with
those assets: The successor had a "substantial degree" of common stockholders with
the predecessor, and had some management "intimately involved" with both operations.
Id. at 176. The connection between the two corporations, however, was not as close
as in Jackson. The successor was certainly not a mere continuation of its predecessor.
The transaction did not amount to fraud. Yet the court imposed liability under the
continuity of the enterprise theory because "[the successor] was in the same position
as [the predecessor] to assume the risk-spreading function which is the underpinning
of strict liability." Id. Both products liability exceptions embrace this policy.
30. See, e.g., Trimper v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Holloway v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454 (D. S.C. 1977);
Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 1983).
31. United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D. N.H. 1985).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1986).
[Vol. 56
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includes "corporations" in the definition but is silent as to whether "successor
corporations" are also included.33
Despite the "aura of uncertainty" surrounding successor liability in
CERCLA, courts have spoken with virtual unanimity to this issue; they rely
on several grounds to invoke the doctrine of successor liability. First, the
sparse legislative history of CERCLA reveals that more specific terms of
liability were deleted.3' Therefore, many courts reason, "Congress expected
the courts to develop a federal common law to supplement the statute."36
Second, a federal common law insures consistent results across states with
inconsistent statutes of successor liability.3 7 Third, the Act "leaves no doubt
that Congress intended the burden to fall on [taxpayers] only when the
responsible parties lack the wherewithal to meet their obligations.83 Such
intent supports choosing a successor corporation over the taxpayer to bear the
costs. Fourth, the Act is designed to provide a remedy, and should not be
interpreted to frustrate this design.39 And finally, the same concerns that
called for the doctrine of successor liability in the tort context apply to the
CERCLA context: without the doctrine responsibility could easily be
evaded.40
For some or all of these reasons, all courts but one have held the doctrine
of successor liability applicable under CERCLA.4
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1980).
34. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081
(1st Cir. 1986).
35. 126 CONG. REc. S14964, S15004, H11787, H11799; 126 CONG. REc. H9465
(daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Madigan); 126 CONG. REC. H9466 (daily
ed. Sept. 23, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Stockman). See United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp. 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
36. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 US. 1029 (1989).
37. See United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 n.8 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
38. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92.
39. See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir.
1985).
40. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91-92.
41. See Anspec Company, Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 793 (E.D.
Mich. 1989) (court declined to impose successor liability because CERCLA did not
provide specifically for it), appeal dismissed, 891 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1989).
1991]
7
Stewart: Stewart: Cover your Assets
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Im[. THE INSTANT DECISION
Again, in order to impose liability, the Distler court had to do two things:
first, decide that CERCLA allowed successor liability; and second, decide how
to apply such liability to the instant case.
The first task was simple. The court aligned itself with the majority, as
represented by Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.,42 and
reiterated several of the justifications for applying the doctrine of successor
liability in the CERCLA context. In particular the court emphasized that
CERCLA's remedial goals should not be frustrated in any way, and responsi-
ble parties rather than taxpayers should bear the burden of cleanup 3
The court next tackled how to apply the doctrine. Analysis of the second
inquiry requires a brief history of the defendant corporation. Several
professional corporate liquidators formed the Angell Manufacturing Corpora-
tion, "Angell-2," in order to purchase a division of another corporation,
"Angell-1."44 It was Angell-1 which contracted for the disposal of hazardous
wastes. 41 After the purchase, Angell-2 continued the same product
line-metal name plates used by electronic manufacturers-with minimal
changes.46
Three years later, three employees of Angell-2 formed a new corporation,
"Angell," which assumed the name of the original companiy after acquiring
substantially all the assets of Angell-2.47 Angell-2 then dissolved.8
Importantly, no shareholders or directors of Angell-2 became shareholders or
directors of Angell. 49 Angell employed the same products, however, and
served the same customers as its predecessor for three to four years.50
The only traditional exception seriously at issue was the mere continua-
tion exception." Because there was no common identity of stockholders and
directors, however, no mere continuation could be said to exist.52 Neverthe-
less, the court noted that this result would "clearly be victory of form over
substance and contrary to congressional intent that producers of hazardous
42. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 639.
43. Id. at 640.
44. Id. at 639.
45. Id. at 638.





51. See supra note 17.
52. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 642.
[Vol. 56
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substances be held liable for improper disposal of those substances under
CERCLA."s3 It did not mention whether consideration was adequate. The
court relied on language from Smith Land's call for increased successor
liability. The following passage provides the crux of the instant decision:
Congressional intent supports the conclusion that, when choosing between
the taxpayers or a successor corporation, the successor should bear the cost.
Benefits from the use of the pollutant as well as savings resulting from the
failure to use non-hazardous disposal methods inured to the original
corporation, its successors, and their respective stockholders and accrued
only indirectly, if at all, to the general public. We believe it in line with
the thrust of the legislation to permit-if not require-successor liability
under traditional concepts.54
The court's interpretation of this holding is its most revealing passage.
Despite Smith Land's explicit intent "to permit-if not require-successor
liability under traditional concepts,"55  Distler asserts that its "overall
message .. . is that courts applying the doctrine of successor liability in
CERCLA cases are to apply it in such a fashion as to further the goals of the-
Act whether that be done by applying the traditional rule or some varia-
tion. ,56
To explain, the court reasons that the "word 'traditional' fails to negate
the rationale of the rest of the passage that the courts should apply the
doctrine so as to further CERCLA's policy of holding responsible parties
liable."57  The court advocates a "common sense" approach rather than an
"overly restricted look at the corporate transfer" to determine liability.8 To
do otherwise might conflict with remedial goals, it warns.59 Hence, the court
liberates itself of the restrictions of the traditional rule.
After this liberation, the court adopts the continuity of the enterprise
exception as a more acceptable rule.60 Importantly, it does not suggest that
this is the only appropriate variation. Liability should be imposed without
regard to the traditional limitations of the doctrine to meet the remedial goals
of CERCLA.6' It leaves unanswered the question of what "some variation"
might include. The court does not suggest that the continuity of the enterprise
53. Id. at 643.
54. Id. at 641 (citing Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91-92).
55. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92.
56. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 641 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 642 n.4.
58. Id.
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rule provides a new limitation on liability beyond which courts should not go.
Instead, it adopts an ends-justifies-means approach. The question of how to
impose liability must remain focused on one objective: that corporations
answer for proper disposal of hazardous waste.62
Unfortunately, there is little legal analysis. The court does not discuss
how the criteria of this new exception are met. The opinion ends with the
denial of Angell's 12(b)(6) motion and the suggestion that the corporation
may well be liable as a continued enterprise of its successor.63 Even though
it had added different customers and long since discontinued the same product
line, equipment, and raw materials, it could be liable for its predecessor's
acts.64 The court explained that Angell's "change of production through a
natural response to market conditions does not change the fact that at the time
of transfer the companies were virtually identical."65 As such, under the
products line exception, the successor should bear virtually identical
liabilities-including costs of the hazardous waste cleanup."
IV. COMMENT
Few will be surprised that the rules of successor liability under CERCLA
are evolving to hold liable increasingly large circles of parties. The Office of
Technology Assessment places the number of hazardous waste sites at
300,000.67 Cleanup costs for these cites have been estimated at $500 billion
dollars.68 With the current budgetary woes, these numbers pressure courts
to create new ways to hold corporations liable and avoid further burdening
taxpayers. Perhaps, however, this pressure is producing bad law-or at least
law that needs substanfial refinement. Successor corporations are not the only
parties with cause to be anxious about expanding successor liability.
Proponents of CERCLA may find their goals undermined by it.
62. Id. The court stated, "The issue is, rather, one of [CERCLA law]: does a
manufacturer's responsibility for its [hazardous waste] survive a change in ownership,
where the manufacturing business, as such, maintains its identity and continues to
operate as before at the same old stand." Id. (quoting Ray v. Alad Corp., 55 Cal. App.
3d 855, 857, 127 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819-20 (1976), vacated, 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3,
136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
63. Id.
64. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 642.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUPERFUND STRATEGY 14 (1985).
This number includes municipal and industrial landfills.
68. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ASSESSING CONTRACTOR USE IN
SUPERFUND 1 & n.1 (1989).
[Vol. 56
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/9
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
The significance of Distler goes beyond the invocation of a products
liability rule. Distler hints that successor liability doctrines continue to
expand to insure response cost reimbursement. The opinion injects even more
uncertainty in an already uncertain area of the law.
By refusing to commit to either the traditional doctrine of successor
liability or a single variation, the court ignores a fundamental goal of
CERCLA: uniformity of law.69 A primary reason to impose a federal
common law standard of successor liability was to avoid "[t]he possibility of
varying [state] standards of successor liability and the resulting inconsistent
results under CERCLA."70 This same problem of inconsistency exists when
federal courts are allowed to apply "some variation" to the rules of successor
liability. As explained by one critic, "variation allows circumvention and
creates confusion. Therefore, to be efficacious, courts must impose CERCLA
successor liability through a uniform common law standard. 7 1  Ample
precedent under the traditional rules would expedite this uniformity. The
common law could be fleshed out efficiently by merely adopting it.
Even assuming the court intended to condone only the products liability
exception, corporations should remain anxious. When the court shifted from
the traditional to the products paradigm of successor liability, it implicitly
shifted its rationale for imposing successor liability. The court became less
concerned with transactions that might amount to fraud, and more concerned
with the risk-spreading functions of the successor.72 Simply, the court took
a substantial step toward holding corporations liable merely because they can
pay and collect, and not because they are wrongdoers.
The actual results of this risk-spreading function may be counter-
productive for CERCLA. The "common sense" approach adopted by Distler
liberates the courts from restrictive applications of liability, but simultaneously
releases any element of predictability by which corporations may structure
their activities. The result is almost certainly a chilling effect on asset
transfers. As transferred assets increase a corporation's risk of liability, they
decrease in value.
Many courts rejected the products liability rules of successor liability for
exactly this reason. As explained by one court, "The economy as a whole
suffers . .. since corporate acquisitions are discouraged due to business
planners' fears of being held so liable. Furthermore, the marketability of
ongoing corporations is diminished, perhaps forcing sellers into the undesir-
69. See United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
70. Id. at 1308 n.8.
71. Note, CERCLA, Successor Liability, and the Federal Common Law:
Responding to an Uncertain Standard, 68 Tax L. REV. 1237, 1265 (1990).
72. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
1991]
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able process of liquidation proceedings."73  If Distler expands liability
beyond products liability boundaries then this economic effect increases. If
so, this liability actually undermines CERCLA's goals of reimbursed costs.
It is impossible to collect response costs from a corporation which no longer
exists; it is, at best, difficult to collect from a bankrupt.74
Expanded liability may also undermine CERCLA's goal of preventing
further improper hazardous waste disposal. CERCLA allows defendant
corporations to join or seek indemnification from other potentially liable
parties. 7  Distler's expanded liability would allow more parties to be
joined.76  Some absurd situations ensue: the same tainted asset, if sold
several times, could invoke liability for a single act several times over. The
generator of hazardous waste could actually decrease its share of the cost by
maximizing the number of other parties. According to one critic, this scheme
"necessarily destroys the deterrent value of response costs-response costs
become an ordinary risk of doing business.""
Many courts justify following assets with liability on the grounds that the
successor receives the benefits from the predecessor's improper disposal.78
In fact, one rationale for the products liability rule is that it more fairly
imposes a burden on the successor which exploits the good will of its
predecessor.79 In the CERCLA context, one court explains that "equities
favor successor liability . . .[b]ecause it is the successor corporations who
have benefitted from any polluting practices of their predecessor."80 Distler
directly quotes Smith Land's version of this argument that "benefits from use
of the pollutant[s] as well as savings resulting from the failure to use non-
hazardous disposal methods inured to the original corporation, [and] its
successors." '  This reasoning ignores the fact that if a successor pays
adequate consideration for the assets then it has not been benefitted. The
73. Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049-50 (Fla. 1982).
74. See generally Bernstein & Squire, Bankruptcy Escape from Cleanup Duties
Limited, LEGAL IMEs, Feb. 24, 1986, at 30.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988).
76. CERCLA provides that "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other
person who is liable... under section 9607(a)." Id. In addition, a person "who has
resolved its liability to the United States ... for some or all of a response action
.'.. in an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from
any person who is not party to a settlement." Id. § 9613(f)(3)(B).
77. See Note, supra note 71, at 1263.
78. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 31, 560 P.2d 3, 9, 136 Cal.Rptr.
574, 581 (1977).
80. Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1459 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
81. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 641 (quoting from Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91-92).
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predecessor alone receives the benefit. The amount paid replaces the assets,
so that the interests of those collecting from the predecessor are not impaired.
Only where the predecessor does not pay full value or continues the
successor's practice do the "savings resulting from the failure to use non-
hazardous disposal"" inure to the successor's benefit. In either case
traditional rules provide adequate recourse. If the predecessor does not pay
full value then the transaction satisfies the mere continuation exception or the
fraudulent transaction exception. Where the corporation produces its own
benefits by continuing to improperly dispose of hazardous waste, no successor
doctrine is necessary to hold it liable.
Perhaps viewing Distler as seminal rather than finished yields a more
palatable result. The case provides a pivotal moment in the history of
CERCLA liability; it provides courts with the opportunity to examine the
successor issue without restrictions, then to reconstruct them as needed.
Distler's place in the legal history confirms this interpretation.
An earlier case, Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co.,s provided fertile ground
for the growth of Distler. In Kelley, the asset-purchasing corporation had the
same sole shareholder, president, treasurer, and director as the seller.8s
Furthermore, the purchaser did not pay adequate consideration for the
assets.ss Evidence suggested the transfer was designed to protect them from
a groundwater contamination suit.s6 Clearly the facts of the case satisfied all
the mere continuation criteria. s Yet, the court discussed only the common
identity criterion and still imposed liability.ss It noted that
the historical basis for imposing successor liability is founded upon the
principles of equity that seek to prevent creditors of the original corporation
from being left without a remedy while the corporation escapes responsibili-
ty by transferring its assets into a new form.... [Yet] [t]he court also
believes that the equities favor successor liabilities here, as in other
successor liability contexts, because it is the successor corporations who
have benefitted from any polluting practices of their predecessor.s9
82. Id.
83. 725 F. Supp. 1446 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
84. Id. at 1451.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1449-50.
87. Id. at 1458.
88. Id. at 1458.
89. Id. at 1459.
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The limited consideration of the mere continuation factors coupled with the
invocation of "principles of equity" gives a tacit blessing to expanding
liability. The court unlocks the door that Distler then throws wide open.
A subsequent case, Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco,90 may be viewed
as closing the door a bit. It reimposes certain limitations on Distler. In
Asarco, the court had to address whether successor liability existed where no
traditional exceptions were met.9' The third party plaintiff, seeking indemni-
fication, asked the court to apply the continuity of the enterprise exception to
the third party defendant. The court declined-although it refused to rule out
the exception in all situations.92 It distinguished the instant case from a case
where the exception might be appropriate based on two notions: actual
production of the hazardous substance, and notice of the liability.'
According to Asarco, merely purchasing tainted assets was not enough.
A corporation must be an actual generator of such waste to be liable. It must
continue producing the waste.94 This restriction limits the drastic results
foreshadowed by Distler where the deterrent effect of CERCLA liability
would actually be undermined by holding liable all parties with tainted assets,
rather than just those who generated the waste.95
The court also relied on a previous decision, Oner II v. E.PA,9 to
explain another limitation on liability. In Oner the court affirmed E.P.A.'s
authority to extend liability to successors.97 Liability was deemed appropri-
ate because both successor and predecessor shared the same president. Hence,
the successor had notice of an outstanding debt to the E.P.A.98 The court
reapplied this notice criteria in the context of Asarco. In Asarco the
predecessor "did not have actual notice of [the successor's] potential
liability."99 This was not an attempt to evade liability because "[a]t the time
of the asset sale, [the successor] had not been identified as a potentially
responsible party."'" The notice criterion reintroduces a notion of the
traditional rules of successor liability: it holds liable parties who know of
90. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1265.
93. Id. at 1265-66.
94. Id. at 1266.
95. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
96. 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1989).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 186.
99. Asarco, 909 F.2d at 1265.
100. Id. at 1265-66.
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liability and attempt to transfer out of it. It reintroduces the traditional notion
of imposing liability where the transfer "amount[s] to fraud. '10 '
V. CONCLUSION
Exactly where Asarco leaves the Distler decision is speculative. It raises
at least as many questions as it answers. For example, it is unclear whether
notice would be relevant when the transfer of tainted assets occurred before
CERCLA was passed, or whether a successor would still escape liability when
the actual generator is no longer in existence.
The juxtaposition of the two cases, however, provides insight into the
future of successor liability cases under CERCLA. No longer are courts
solely concerned with avoiding the fraudulent effect of asset transfers.
Principles of equity must be factored in. Liability is based on some
combination of two rationales: preventing corporate sleight of hand from
hiding assets from liability, and spreading risks. Corporations may no longer
depend on bona fide, arms' length transfers to insulate them from liability.
Courts are increasiigly willing to call upon principles of equity to supplement
the traditional rules.
It is unclear how far the risk-spreading rationale will goad courts into
imposing liability. The rules of applying it, however, may be counter
productive to CERCLA's goals of reimbursement and deterrence. Even-
handed enforcement will be impossible until the courts can agree on a rule.
Furthermore, the chilling effect on asset transfers caused by greatly increasing
the risk of liability may make collecting from fiscally-sound corporations
difficult. Likewise, if generators'of hazardous waste are able to decrease their
liability by joining parties which purchased their tainted assets, then effective
deterrence is undercut. Courts should be reminded that these problems solve
themselves under the traditional doctrine.
TERESA STEWART
101. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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